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This viewpoint describes previous and ongoing research for the U.S. Navy on deception 
and its application within robotic systems. Three areas are reviewed including:  (1) the 
use of psychological interdependence theory as the basis for producing deception in 
robotic systems in order to evade capture, which focuses on when to deceive and a game-
theoretic action-selection mechanism by which deception can be achieved; (2) studying 
deception in squirrel hoarding as means for misleading a predator regarding hidden 
cached resources; and (3) mimicking bird mobbing behaviors as they apply to deceptive 
activity to assess the value and risks associated in feigning strength when none exists. 
 
There are many extant definitions of deception. Our working definition that frames the 
rest of this discussion is “deception simply is a false communication that tends to benefit 
the communicator” [Bond and Robinson 88]. Robotics research is slowly progressing in 
this space, with some of the earliest work developed by [Floreano et al. 07] focusing on 
the evolutionary edge that deceit can provide within a group of robotic agents.  
 
Partner Modeling: Deception and Interdependence Theory 
 
As an outgrowth of our research in robot-human trust, where robots were concerned as to 
whether or not to trust a human partner rather than the other way around, we considered 
the dual of trust: deception. As any good conman knows, trust is a precursor for 
deception [Salehi-Abari and White 10], so the transition to this domain seemed natural. 
We were able to apply the same models of interdependence theory [Kelley and Thibaut 
78] used in our trust research and game theory, to create a framework whereby a robot 
could make decisions regarding both when to deceive and how to deceive [Wagner and 
Arkin 11]. This involves the use of partner modeling, a simplistic view of theory of mind, 
to enable the robot to (1) assess a situation; (2) recognize whether conflict and 
dependence exist in that situation between deceiver and mark, which serves an indicator 
of the value of deception; (3) probe the partner (mark) to develop an understanding of 
their potential actions and perceptions; and (4) then choose an action which induces an 
incorrect outcome assessment in the partner.  These results have been implemented for a 
simple pursuit-evasion task (hide and seek) both in simulation and tested on robotic 
systems successfully1 (Fig. 1 Top). 
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Figure 1: (Top) Experimental Layout for Robot deception based on Interdependence 
Theory. (Bottom) Experimental layout for misleading competitors based on squirrel 
patrolling strategies. 
 
Changing Strategies to Mislead 
 
An interesting example in nature regarding the possible role of deception was uncovered 
that involves patrolling strategies used by squirrels to protect their food caches from other 
predators [Steele et al. 08]. Normally the squirrel spends time between caches that are 
well stocked. It was observed however that when a predator is present (typically 
conspecifics that are interested in raiding a cache) the squirrel changes its patrolling 
behavior to now spend time visiting empty cache sites, with the apparent intent to 
mislead the raider into the belief that those sources are where the valuables are located, a 
diversionary tactic of sorts.  This is a form of misdirection, where communication is done 
implicitly through a behavioral change by the deceiver. We have implemented this 
strategy in simulation [Shim and Arkin 12] and, not surprisingly, it was found that these 
deceptive behaviors worked effectively, enabling robots to perform better with deception 
than without with respect to delaying the time of the discovery of the cache. Figure 1 
(Bottom) shows the experimental layout. 
 
Feigning Strength: Deception and the Handicap Principle 
 
Steered by our discussions with biologists, we then investigated the handicap principle, 
[Zahavi and Zahavi 97], as a means for understanding honest and dishonest signaling in 
animal species.  While the original formulation of the handicap principle stated that all 
signaling in biology must be honest when there exists a sufficiently high cost,  [Johnstone 
and Grafen 93] argued that a certain level of dishonesty (bluffing) could be introduced 
while preserving the overall stability of the system in the presence of such deceit.  This 
requires a delicate balance of knowing when it is important to generate such a false signal 
and its costs relative to the value of the potential success.  We explored this phenomenon 
[Davis and Arkin 12] in the context of bird mobbing behavior, which served as an 
original case study for the handicap principle. This model assesses the value of a less-
than-fit bird (that would be prone to capture if set upon) joining a mob where group 
harassment, if sufficiently strong, can lead to the abandonment of an attack by the 
predator.  
 
Our simulation studies showed that deception is the best strategy when the addition of 
deceitful agents pushes the mob size to the minimum level required to produce the level 
of frustration in the predator that causes it to flee. In this case, the predator is driven away 
and no mob member is attacked. For smaller mob sizes, complete honesty yields the 
lowest mortality rate since the punishment for bluffing is high. If the cost of bluffing is 
reduced, adding deception can result in a reduced mortality rate when the predator 
attacks.  Quantitative results appear in [Davis and Arkin 12]. We are now in the process 




We have successfully demonstrated the value of biologically-inspired deception in three 
separate cases as applied to robotic systems: (1) pursuit-evasion using interdependence 
theory when hiding from an enemy; (2) misdirection based on behavioral changes; and 
(3) feigning strength when it does not exist.  It should be noted that the area of robotic 
deception is still in its infancy and considerable further study is required to make 
definitive assertions about its overall value.  This is with particular regard to situations 
that are not simple one-shot deception scenarios, but rather require far more sophistical 
mental models of the mark in order to be able to sustain deceptive activity for longer time 
periods. 
 
There are serious ethical questions regarding the role of deception in intelligent artifacts 
capable of deceiving humans, which we have discussed elsewhere [Arkin et al 12]. We 
note that Sun Tzu is quoted as saying that “All warfare is based on deception”, and 
Machiavelli in The Discourses states that “Although deceit is detestable in all other 
things, yet in the conduct of war it is laudable and honorable”, so it appears there is a 
valuable role for this capability in robotic warfare. Indeed there is an entire U.S. Army 
Field Manual on the subject of deception in the battlefield [U.S. Army 88]. Nonetheless, 
leakage of these research ideas and results outside of the military domain can give rise to 
significant ethical concerns. We strongly encourage further discussion regarding the 
pursuit and application of research in deception as applied to intelligent machines to 
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